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I. INTRODUCTION
Although Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act' al-
most thirty years ago, the struggle to eradicate discrimination in the
work place continues. This battle is being waged in our court system.
Title VII litigation is problematic by its nature because it is usually
limited to circumstantial evidence.2 Discrimination is often subtle and
therefore difficult to prove. This is because discriminatory motive, as
with any motive, is particularly elusive. The plaintiff's case, then, may
consist of nothing more than circumstantial evidence, requiring the fact
finder to make inferences about discriminatory intent.
In interpreting Title VII, the Supreme Court must rely on Congres-
sional intent. In this respect, the Court has concluded that Congress in-
tended to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate
discriminatory employment practices which have harmed minority
citizens.4 While this general purpose is rather uncomplicated, institut-
ing rules that govern the application of Title VII has proven to be a
difficult task.5 Proof of this difficulty is demonstrated by the conflict
between the legislative and judicial branches in explaining the Act.6
Consequently, the Court continues to define and explain the evi-
dentiary framework of Title VII litigation. This Comment discusses St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. In Hicks, a divided Court8 held that
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Tit. VII §§ 701-716 (1964) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
2. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)
(pointing out that there is seldom 'eyewitness' testimony about the employer's mental pro-
cesses).
3. See id. at 716-17.
4. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2757 (1993) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
5. For example, the 1991 Amendment to the Civil Rights Act expressly lists that one
of its purposes is to overturn Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989),
regarding plaintiff's level of proof in the rebuttal stage of a disproportionate impact claim.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Supp. III 1991); see also JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN AND GEORGE M.
STRICKLER, JR., TiE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 248 (1993).
6. See supra note 5.
7. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
8. Id. (Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
218 [Vol. 96:217
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if an employer's articulated reasons for the adverse employment deci-
sion are disbelieved by the fact finder, such a finding, standing alone,
does not compel judgment for the plaintiff.9 This Comment ultimately
argues that Hicks changed the established evidentiary framework as
first developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.'°
Section two of this Comment provides the factual and procedural
posture of the case. In short, the plaintiff established a prima facie
case and discredited the defendant's reasons, but was ultimately defeat-
ed." The issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Hicks is whether,
by discrediting the defendant's explanation for the employment action,
the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' 2 The
Eighth Circuit held that such a finding did compel judgment for the
plaintiff as a matter of law.13 The Supreme Court reversed this hold-
ing by a majority of one vote. 4
Section three examines the background that led to the issue raised
in Hicks. 5 Section four explains the reasoning of the majority afid
the dissent, both of which claim to rely on established precedent. Sec-
tion five of this Comment presents a critical analysis of the opinion by
discussing the consequences that will follow from this holding.16 Most
importantly, this holding enlarges the scope of the relevant issues at
trial. 17 Furthermore, section five concludes with the position that this
case represents a change in the evidentiary framework as first estab-
lished in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.'8 Because of this
change, the majority opinion is contrary to the general purpose of Title
VII, which is to deter "unlawful harassment and intentional discrimina-
O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J.; Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
White, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J. joined).
9. Id. at 2749.
10. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
11. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
12. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
13. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992).
14. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2745 (1993).
15. Id. at 2746.
16. Id. at 2742.
17. See id. at 2763 (Souter, J. dissenting).
18. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a discussion of the McDonnell Douglas analysis see
infra part Ill.
1993]
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tion in the workplace."' 9 Accordingly, this Comment will propose
Congressional action to restore the law in accordance with the spirit of
Title VII.
20
Finally, the West Virginia Human Rights Act and Title VII both
have as one of several purposes the elimination of discrimination in
the workplace.2' West Virginia has even adopted the McDonnell
Douglas analysis for cases filed under The West Virginia Human
Rights Act.22 Nonetheless, this Comment maintains that the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia, when faced with the Hicks issue,
should adopt the position of the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC), 3 as set forth in Justice Souter's dissent in Hicks.24
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case alleging racial discrimination in the workplace.
Melvin Hicks, an African-American, worked for St. Mary's Honor
Center as a correctional officer and later as a shift commander.25 He
enjoyed a satisfactory employment record from 1978 until 1984.26 In
fact, the plaintiff was promoted to a supervisory position in 1980.27
In 1983, Steve Long became the superintendent of St. Mary's Honor
Center and John Powell became the plaintiff's immediate supervisor.28
After this changeover, the plaintiff began experiencing problems at
work.29 In March of 1984, a series of events occurred involving mis-
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Supp. III 1991) (listing purposes of the 1991 amendment).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988 &. Supp. 111 1991), as amended.
21. See W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to -19 (1990 & Supp. 1993); see also 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a).
22. See, e.g., Shepherdstown V.F.D. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 309 S.E.2d
342, 352-53 (W. Va. 1983).
23. Brief for E.E.O.C. as Amici Curiae, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct.
2742 (1993) (No. 92-602).
24. 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2756 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 2746.
26. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 489 (8th Cir. 1992).
27. Id. at 488.
28. Id. at 489.
29. Id.
'220 [Vol. 96:217
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conduct by the plaintiffs subordinates. 0 Consequently, a disciplinary
review board, of which John Powell was a member, demoted the
plaintiff.3' His subordinates, however, were not disciplined in any
way.3
2
After hearing the news of his demotion, the plaintiff requested and
was granted the day off.33 As the plaintiff was leaving, Mr. Powell
followed him and ordered him to turn over his shift commander manu-
al.34 This prompted a heated verbal exchange between the plaintiff
and Mr. Powell.35 As a result, Mr. Powell sought disciplinary action
alleging that Mr. Hicks had threatened him.36 A disciplinary board
recommended a three day suspension, but Mr. Long recommended that
Hicks be discharged.37 Mr. Long testified that the plaintiff's discharge
recommendation was based on the plaintiff's accumulation and severity
of institutional violations.38 Pursuant to Mr. Powell's recommendation,
Mr. Long discharged the plaintiff on June 7, 1984.39
During this same period from January through June of 1984, the
plaintiff reported institutional violations by other employees on several
occasions.4 0 His reports, however, were generally ignored by supervi-
sors.4 1 All of the employees who were the subjects of these ignored
reports were white. 42
As a result of these facts, Melvin Hicks filed a complaint in the
Eastern District of Missouri alleging racial discrimination in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.43 The named
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The district court concluded that Powell had provoked the plaintiff into behaving
irrationally. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1251 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
37. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 489 (8th Cir. 1992).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. -Id. at 490.
41. Id.
42. id.
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991), as amended; Hicks v. St.
1993]
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defendant's were St. Mary's Honor Center and Steve Long.44 The
plaintiff also filed an equal protection claim against Mr. Long under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.4s
After a bench trial on the merits, the district court entered judg-
ment in favor of the defendants.46 The district court held that the
plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination. 47 The
district court also held that the defendant met the burden of production
by articulating a legitimate reason for the discharge.48 This legitimate
reason was the accumulation and severity of institutional violations by
the plaintiff.49 In this regard, however, the district court also found
that the "[p]laintiff [had] carried his burden in proving that the reasons
given for his demotion and termination were pretextual. 5 ° In other
words, the district court did not believe the employer's explanation.5
Nonetheless, the district court entered judgment for the defendants on
the ground that the plaintiff had failed to meet his ultimate burden of
proving discrimination.52 The basis of this conclusion was (1) that
two blacks sat on the disciplinary review board, (2) that the plaintiff's
black subordinates who committed the violations were not disciplined
and (3) that the. employer retained a constant number of black employ-
ees.53 The district court found that this evidence precluded a finding
of intentional discrimination.54 Instead, the district court assumed that
the defendant's actions were "personally motivated. 55
On the plaintiffs behalf, the EEOC participated in the appeal to
the Eighth Circuit as amici curiae.5 6 The plaintiff and the EEOC ar-
Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
44. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. 1245.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1244-45.
47. Id. at 1249.
48. Id. at 1250.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1251.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1252.
53. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748 n.2 (1993).
54. Id.
55. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992).
56. Id. at 488.
222 (Vol. 96:217
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gued that the plaintiff had sustained his burden of proof by discredit-
ing the defendant's proffered reasons, and that judgment for the plain-
tiff was therefore compelled.5 7 The Eighth Circuit agreed and con-
cluded that the district court erred in assuming that the defendant's ac-
tions were somehow personally motivated. 8 This assumption was
wrong, according to the Eighth Circuit, because the defendant simply
never articulated that personal motivation was the reason for the em-
ployment action.5 9  Thus, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court's judgment, ordered judgment to be entered for the plaintiff, and
remanded the case for further findings on the remaining issues, includ-
ing damages.6
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve a split in the
circuits over whether judgment should be automatically entered in the
plaintiff's favor when the plaintiff discredits the defendant's explana-
tion for the employment action. 61 Again the EEOC intervened as ami-
ci curiae supporting the view that when the trier of fact rejects the
57. Id.
58. Id. at 492.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 493.
61. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2750 (1993). Justice Scalia
cited numerous court of appeals decisions which represent the divergent views on this issue.
Compare, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding of
pretext does not mandate finding of illegal discrimination); Galbraith v. Northern Telecom,
Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1991) (same) (opinion of Boggs, J.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1497 (1992); 944 F.2d at 283 (same) (opinion of Guy, J., concurring in result);
Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 (1st Cir. 1991) (same); Holder v. City of
Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 827-828 (4th Cir. 1989) (same); Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental
Health & Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529
(11th Cir. 1983) (same) (dictum), with Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492-
93 (8th Cir. 1992) (case below) (finding of pretext mandates finding of illegal discrimina-
tion), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 954 (1993); Tye v. Board of Educ. of Polaris Joint Voca-
tional Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987);
King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same); Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh
Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395-96 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984);
Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 228 (1991); Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554 (11th Cir.
1990) (same) (dictum); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 639-
40, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1985) (same) (dictum).
1993]
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employer's proffered reasons, judgment for the plaintiff is mandated.62
The EEOC was joined by the Solicitor General, also as amici curi-
ae.63 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that a finding that the
defendant's proffered reasons are untrue does not compel judgment for
the plaintiff as a matter of law.64 Accordingly, the Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the Eighth circuit. 65 In turn, the Eighth Circuit
remanded the case to the district court,66 where it is currently pend-
ing.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
The relevant portion of Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 6 The Supreme
Court teaches that Title VII requires the removal of artificial and arbi-
trary barriers that discriminate on the basis of racial or other illegal
classifications. 68 In achieving this goal, the Supreme Court has articu-
lated an evidentiary framework to govern Title VII disparate treatment
cases.
69
A. The McDonnell Douglas Analysis
More than twenty years ago, the Supreme Court first laid down an
evidentiary framework for allocating the burden of proof in Title VII
cases.70 In McDonnell Douglas Corp., the plaintiff was a black civil
rights activist who, upon being discharged, illegally protested against
62. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2765 (Souter, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2749.
65. Id. at 2756.
66. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 2 F.3d 265 (8th Cir. 1993) (on remand from 113
S. Ct. 2742).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
68. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
69. Id. at 792.
70. Id. at 802.
[Vol. 96:217
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the defendant. 7' The plaintiff helped stage a "stall-in" on the road
near the defendant's business during a shift change. This resulted in
traffic problems and the plaintiff was fined for obstructing traffic.72
Several weeks after the protest, the defendant publicly advertised for
mechanics, the plaintiff's trade.73 The plaintiff re-applied for employ-
ment but was turned down because of his illegal protest activity
against the defendant.74 Plaintiff subsequently filed suit alleging racial
discrimination.75 These facts ultimately resulted in the Supreme Court
setting forth an evidentiary framework for Title VII litigation.76
First, the plaintiff must prove his prima facie case of discrimina-
tion by a preponderance of the evidence.77 The plaintiffs prima facie
case may be met by showing four elements:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was quali-
fied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant's qualifications. 8
The prima facie case thereby serves to eliminate the most common,
legitimate reasons for an adverse employment decision.79
The elements of the prima facie case will vary as Title VII factual
situations vary. 0 For example, the first element might be that
plaintiffs must show that they are a member of a protected class under
Title VII.8 The second element could be stated more generally to say
that plaintiffs must demonstrate that they suffered an adverse employ-
71. Id. at 794-95.
72. Id. at 795.
73. Id. at 796.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 792.
76. In remanding to the district court, the Eighth Circuit had attempted to formulate
standards to govern Title VII claims. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court set forth its own
analysis. See id. at 797, 802.
77. Id. at 802.
78. Id.
79. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981).
80. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
81. See id.
19931
9
Postle: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Interpretation of Title VII Tak
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ment decision.82 Thus, the McDonnell Douglas standard is a flexible
one that accounts for varying factual situations such as hiring, dis-
charging, and promoting employees.83
Next, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation, a presumption is created in favor of the employee.84 Conse-
quently, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate
some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
decision.85 If the employer remains silent in light of this presumption,
the. court must enter judgment for the plaintiff.86 If the employer re-
sponds with an explanation, it must be legally sufficient to justify a
judgment for the employer.87
Finally, assuming the defendant meets this burden of coming for-
ward with an explanation, the plaintiff must react. That is, the plaintiff
then has the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the legitimate reasons articulated by the defendant were not the
true reasons, but rather were a pretext for discrimination.88
Stages two and three of the McDonnell Douglas analysis were
clarified in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.89 The
'plaintiff in Burdine alleged that she was denied a promotion and was
discharged because of her sex.90 The District Court for the Western
District of Texas held for the defendant, finding that the defendant had
rebutted the plaintiff's allegation of gender discrimination.9" The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that the defendant bears the burden of prov-
82. See id.
83. Id. at 802 n.13; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (applying McDonnell Douglas
analysis to a lost promotion); Hicks, 756 F. Supp. 1244 (applying McDonnell Douglas anal-
ysis to a discharge).
84. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
85. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
86. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
87. Id. at 255.
88. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
89. 450 U.S. 248 (1983).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 251.
[Vol. 96:217
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ing by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a non-discrim-
inatory reason for the employment action.92
In response to this decision, the Supreme Court reversed and ex-
plained that the burden of persuasion never shifts to the defendant.93
Instead, the defendant's burden is to clearly set forth the reason for its
employment decision. 94 If the defendant meets this burden, "the factu-
al inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity."95 Placing the bur-
den of production on the defendant at this stage serves two purposes.
First, it provides the defendant with an opportunity to meet the
plaintiff's prima facie case and rebut the presumption it creates.96
Second, it forces the defendant to frame the factual issue with clarity
so the plaintiff has a fair opportunity to prove pretext.97
The Court further explained that the plaintiff may meet the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion in one of two ways. 9 First, the plaintiff
can introduce direct evidence to persuade the court that a discriminato-
ry reason more likely than not motivated the employer.99 Second, the
plaintiff can meet the burden of persuasion indirectly by showing that
the employer's reason is unworthy of credence."
Soon after Burdine, the Court again visited the issue of how the
plaintiff meets the burden of proving discrimination. In United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, the issue on appeal was
whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie case through indi-
rect evidence.' 0' The Supreme Court admonished the district court
for requiring the plaintiff to submit direct evidence of discriminatory
intent. 0 2 The Court also stated that, after a case has been fully tried
92. Id. at 252.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 255.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 255-56.
98. Id. at 256.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 460 U.S. 711, 717 (1983).
102. Id.
1993]1
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on the merits, the focus should be on -the ultimate question of inten-
tional discrimination and not on the plaintiff's prima facie case.'0 3
In elaborating on the plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuasion, the
Court repeated verbatim language from Burdine which allows the
plaintiff to indirectly prove discrimination by proving pretext." The
Court then stated that, after the plaintiff attempts to prove pretext, "the
district court must decide which party's explanation of the employer's
motivation it believes."105
Most notably, Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan
joined, concurred in Aikens solely for the purpose of pointing out
exactly what the dissent holds in Hicks.0 6 Justice Blackmun states,
unequivocally, that McDonnell Douglas requires that a plaintiff prevail
upon demonstrating that the defendant's reasons are unworthy of cre-
dence.'07
IV. THE DECISION
The Hicks Court did not decide the case at hand on the merits.
Instead, the Court expounded a general proposition of law.0 8 Simply
stated, Hicks is about the effect that the plaintiff's proof of pretext has
on the outcome of a Title VII action. Pretext is a statement that fails
to describe the actual reason for the employment decision. 9 In
short, a pretext is a falsity. In Hicks, the majority finds that pretext
must always mean pretext for discrimination." 0  Thus, the decisive
question for the majority is not whether the plaintiff has discredited
the employer's reasons, but whether the true reason was discriminato-
103. Id.
104. Id. at 716 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256 (1981)).
105. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
106. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2754 (1993) (the Hicks majority
flatly admits that this is the proper interpretation of Justice Blackmun's concurrence).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 274-2.
109. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
110. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
[Vol. 96:217
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ry. 1' Discrediting the employer's reason may help to prove discrimi-
natory intent.'12 But, even if the defendant's reasons are false, the
fact finder can still conclude that the plaintiff failed to meet the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion.13 In contrast, the dissent argues that
when the plaintiff has discredited the employer's reason, the plaintiff
has automatically proven discriminatory intent by a preponderance of
the evidence." 4
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, commanded a
total of five votes.115 -The Court concluded that even if the plaintiff
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's expla-
nation is unworthy of credence, the plaintiff is still not entitled to
judgement as a matter of law. 16 In so holding, the Court rejected
the Eighth Circuit's reasoning that, because the defendant's reasons
were discredited, the defendant was in no better position than if he
had remained silent.' 7 On the contrary, the Hicks majority held that
such defendants are in a better position than they would have been by
remaining silent." s In other words, the majority held that the
defendant's proffered reason for the employment action, although dis-
credited, served to meet the presumption of discrimination arising from
the plaintiff's prima facie case."9
111. Id. at 2749.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 2763 (Souter, J. dissenting).
115. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2745 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J,
Kennedy, J. and Thomas, J.).
116. Id. at 2749.
117. Id. at 2748. Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, if the defendant remains
silent in light of the plaintiffs prima facie case, the defendant loses. See discussion supra
part III.
118. Id.
119. Id.
1993]
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1. The Majority's Focus on the Plaintiff's Burden of
Proving Discriminatory Intent
The issue in Hicks centered around the question of how and when
the plaintiff's burden of persuasion is met. The majority found that the
Eighth Circuit's holding ignored the Court's repeated admonition that
the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. 20 Furthermore,
the majority warns that the Eighth Circuit's holding disregarded the
teaching of Rule 301,2' which provides that a presumption does not
shift the burden of proof. 22 In so concluding, the majority relied on
two major points.
First, the Court stressed the fact that the plaintiff bears the ulti-
mate burden of persuading the trier of fact that he has been the victim
of intentional discrimination. 123 The Court was concerned that com-
pelling judgment for the *plaintiff who discredited the defendant's rea-
sons may avoid the question of whether the plaintiff really proved
intentional discrimination.4 While proof that the defendant lied may
be sufficient to sustain a judgment for the plaintiff, there must actually
be such a finding of discrimination. 2 1 Simply put, in order for the
plaintiff to prevail, the fact finder must conclude that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Proof of the
defendant's lie may or may not support a finding of discrimina-
tion. 26
Second, the Court emphasized that the defendant only has the
burden of production with regard to articulating a legitimate non-dis-
120. Id. at 2749.
121. FED. R. EVID. 301.
122. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993) ((quoting United
States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (citing Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
123. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
124. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
125. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 n.4.
126. See id.
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criminatory reason. 2' As set forth in Rule 301 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence:
a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden
of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does
not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of
nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom
it was originally cast.'
Consequently, merely coming forward with any legitimate reason suf-
fices to meet the defendant's burden.1 29 The employer has no burden
to persuade the trier of fact that the proffered reason is in fact the true
reason. 3 Accordingly, the Court concluded that judgment for the
plaintiff is not automatically compelled when the fact finder does not
believe the employer's articulated reasons.13'
2. Review of the Relevant Precedent
The Court "begrudgingly 132 turned to a review of the Supreme
Court precedent. 133 The Court began with Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine.134 The majority explained that, while some
statements in Burdine could support the dissent's position, "all but one
of them bear a meaning consistent with our interpretation, and the one
exception is simply incompatible with other language in the case."' 35
The passage to which the Court referred stated that the plaintiff
may succeed in meeting the burden of persuasion "either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
127. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
128. FED. R. EvID. 301.
129. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
130. Id.
131. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
132. Such language is an indication that the majority did not think it was important to
reach a conclusion based on the precedent. Id. at 2751.
133. Id.
134. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
135. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2751.
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explanation is unworthy of credence."' 3 6 The majority agreed with
the dissent that these words indicate that, if the employer's explanation
is a falsity, judgment for the plaintiff is compelled.'37 As previously
mentioned, however, the Court dismissed this passage as incompatible
with other language in the case.' 38
Furthermore, the Court characterized Burdine's references to the
plaintiff's burden of proving simply "pretext" to be reasonably under-
stood to mean "pretext for discrimination."1 39 As indicated, the
employer's explanation is a pretext if it is not the true reason for the
employment decision. 40 According to the majority, the Burdine
Court did not intend to say that by proving pretext, the plaintiff has
automatically proven discrimination.' Instead, the Hicks majority in-
terpreted Burdine's reference to "pretext" as a shorthand way of refer-
ring to "pretext for discrimination."' 42 In addition, the Court in Hicks
urged that a reason cannot be shown to be a pretext for discrimination,
unless it is shown not only that the reason was false, but also that the
real reason was illegal discrimination. 14 3
The next focal point of Burdine held that when the defendant
employer has satisfied the burden of production by rebutting the infer-
ence of discrimination raised by the plaintiffs prima facie case, "the
factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity."'44 This means
that the factual issue is framed with clarity so that the plaintiff will
have a fair opportunity to show that the employer's reasons were a
pretext for discrimination.14 5 The majority rejected the notion that
this statement by the Burdine Court referred simply to the question of
whether the defendant's reasons are true or false. 46 Instead, the ma-
136. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 804-05 (1973)).
137. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S, Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993).
138. Id. at 2751.
139. Id. at 2752 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258).
140. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
141. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
142. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258).
143. Id. at 2749 n.4.
144. Id. at 2752 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255).
145. Id. at 2751-52.
146. Id. at 2752.
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jority interpreted the terms "new level of specificity" to refer to the
specific proofs of discriminatory motivation as introduced by the par-
ties.147 For the majority, narrowing the factual issue to "pretext"
means focusing on discriminatory motivation. 4 '
According to the majority, whatever doubt on this issue that may
have been created by Burdine was eliminated by United States Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens.149 There, the Court held that
"the ultimate question [is] discrimination vel non."'50 The Aikens
Court meant that, after a case has been fully tried on the merits, the
question is one of intentional discrimination.' 5 ' The question is not,
as the parties had framed it on appeal, whether the plaintiff made out
a prima facie case. 5 2 Thus, the Hicks- majority interpreted this to
mean that the plaintiff prevails only if the fact finder makes an actual
finding of discrimination. 5 3
3. A Hypothetical Eliciting the Majority's Concerns
The majority reasons by example. 54 The following is the hypo-
thetical set out by the Court:
Assume that 40% of a business' work force are members of a particular
minority group, a group which comprises only 10% of the relevant labor
market. An applicant, who is a member of that group, applies for an
opening for which he is minimally qualified, but is rejected by a hiring
officer of that same minority group, and the search to fill the opening
continues. The rejected applicant files suit for racial discrimination under
Title VII, and before the suit comes to trial, the supervisor who conducted
the company's hiring is fired.155
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2753 (discussing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711 (1983)).
150. Id. at 2753 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714). But see Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717
(Blackmun, J. concurring).
151. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717.
152. Id. at 713-14.
153. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2753 (1993).
154. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2750-51.
155. Id.
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At trial, the company would have to try to elicit the reason for
refusing to hire the plaintiff from the discharged hiring officer, who is
presumably now hostile to the employer. 156 Thus, Justice Scalia ar-
gued that under the dissent's analysis in Hicks, if the employer offers
a reason that the fact finder does not believe, the fact finder must
nonetheless assess damages against the company even under a belief
that the company was not guilty of racial discrimination.157 Accord-
ingly, the positive facts tending to disprove discrimination would be
deemed irrelevant because, by discrediting the defendant's reasons, the
plaintiff would win automatically. 58
The Court denies that this is the law that the Supreme Court has
created. 5 9 Title VII does not assess damages against an employer
who cannot prove a legitimate reason for an adverse employment ac-
160 de 161tion, nor does Title VII serve as a cause of action for perjury.
Rather, Title VII holds those employers liable when a plaintiff proves
that the employer discriminated against the employee in one of the
fashions proscribed by Title VII 1 62
B. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Souter,' 63 agrees
with the majority that the mandatory presumption which initially arose
from the plaintiff's prima facie case is not resurrected when the
plaintiff proves that the employer's reasons are pretextual.164 Instead,
the dissent saw the issue as whether or not the defendant's explanation
serves to narrow the factual inquiry to the question of pretext.1 65 Jus-
156. Id. at 2751.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2756.
161. Id. at 2754.
162. Id. at 2756.
163. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by White, J., Blackmun, J. and Stevens, J.)
164. Id. at 2759 n.2.
165. Id.
234 [Vol. 96:217
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tice Souter accused the majority of reinterpreting precedent, misreading
Burdine and ignoring the central purpose of the McDonnell Douglas
framework.1 66 This central purpose is "progressively to sharpen the
inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimina-
tion."' 67 The result of the Court's opinion is that, by failing to nar-
row the factual inquiry merely to the question of pretext, a fact finder
is now permitted to choose any reason, articulated or not, to find
against the plaintiff. 68
1. The Dissent's Focus on the Plaintiffs Burden of
Proving Discriminatory Intent
The dissent agreed that the plaintiff, at all times, retains the bur-
den of persuading the trier of fact that he was the victim of intentional
discrimination. 169 Nonetheless, the employer's burden of production
serves an important function. This burden requires the employer "to
frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will
have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.' ' 170 Justice
Souter argued that the plaintiff's burden of persuasion is satisfied when
the plaintiff discredits the defendant's proffered reasons for the adverse
employment action.' 7' The basis for this conclusion is that "common
experience" tells that it is "more likely than not" that, if employers lie,
they are actually covering up the illegal discrimination alleged by the
plaintiff. 172
However, under the majority's scheme, even if the plaintiff proves
that the defendant's reasons are untrue, the fact finder may choose an
unarticulated reason for plaintiff's termination and find for the defen-
dant.173 Thus, the majority "transforms the employer's burden of pro-
166. Id. at 2761.
167. Id. (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8).
168. Id. at 2761 n.10 (1993) (Souter, J. dissenting).
169. Id. at 2760.
170. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. 255-56).
171. Id. at 2760-61.
172. See id. at 2763 (quoting Furmco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978)).
173. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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duction from a device used to provide notice and promote fairness into
a misleading and potentially useless ritual."' 74 Furthermore, the dis-
sent argued against the absurdity of requiring the employer's reason to
be "clear and reasonably specific," if the fact finder can nonetheless
rely on a reason not clearly articulated to rule in favor of the defen-
dant. 75
2. The Dissent's Review of the Relevant Precedent
The dissent also focused on the language from Burdine, explaining
that the plaintiff may succeed in meeting his ultimate burden of per-
suasion "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of cre-
dence."'17 6 The dissent relied on this to argue that the plaintiff pre-
vails by demonstrating that the employer's reasons were false. This in-
terpretation is not in dispute because the majority admitted that "[t]he
words bear no other meaning but that the falsity of the employer's ex-
planation is alone enough to compel judgment for the plaintiff.' ' 77
Furthermore, the dissent interpreted Burdine's reference to "a new
level of specificity" to refer to the specific factual inquiry regarding
the credibility of the defendant's proffered reasons. 178 Thus, that the
plaintiff can prevail by showing that the employer's explanation is not
credible indicates that the case has been narrowed to the question of
pretext. 71
174. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2761 (1993) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing).
175. Id. at 2759 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258).
176. Id. at 2765 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 where Blackmun, J., joined by
Brennan, J., concurred to say that the majority opinion in Aikens "reaffirms the framework
established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green" which, according to Blackmun, is exact-
ly the same proposition that the Hicks dissent now asserts); see also Price-Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 287-89 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (discussing the same issue and
relying on Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Aikens).
177. Id. at 2752.
178. Id. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2760.
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The dissent also pointed out that the Aikens Court quotes the
above language from Burdine and then directs the district court to
"decide which party's explanation of the employer's motivation it
believes."' 80 Thus, by requiring the fact finder to choose either the
plaintiff's or the defendant's explanation, Aikens flatly bars the Court's
conclusion that the fact finder can choose a third explanation, never
offered by the defendant, and rule against the plaintiff.'
81
3. Two Interpretations of the Holding
Justice Souter accused the majority of giving "conflicting signals
about the scope of its holding in this case."' 8 2 Essentially, these two
holdings can be characterized as (1) that a lie by the employer is
sufficient to hold for the plaintiff, although not compelling or (2) that
the plaintiff, in order to prevail, must do more than merely discredit
the defendant's reasons for the employment action.1
8 3
With regard to the first interpretation, the Court stated that, while
judgment for the plaintiff is not compelled, such evidence "will permit
the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimina-
tion." 8 4 As Justice Souter pointed out, that same view may be in-
ferred from the Court's decision to remand this case, keeping the
plaintiff's chance of prevailing alive, even though he has done nothing
more than show that the defendant's reasons are unworthy of cre-
dence. '
The second possible reading of the Court's opinion, however,
bothered the dissent. Justice Souter feared a more severe conclusion
that proof of the defendant's lie will not be adequate to sustain a judg-
ment for the plaintiff. The Court stated that the plaintiff must show
"both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real
180. Id. at 2765 (quoting United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. at 716).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2762.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2749.
185. Id. at 2762 (Souter, J. dissenting).
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reason." 186 Moreover, the Court explicitly states that "[i]t is not
enough . . . to dis believe the employer; the factfinder must believe
the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination."'' 1 7 The dis-
sent argues strongly against such a pretext-plus rule. Justice Souter
claimed that such a rule would "turn Burdine on its head" and would
often result in summary judgment for employers where employees have
no direct evidence beyond proving a prima facie case and discrediting
the defendant's reasons. 88
4. Negative Consequences of the Holding
The dissent was dismayed about the consequences that this deci-
sion will have on both actual and potential Title VII litigants. The
majority's scheme places a heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff by
requiring the plaintiff to prove more than just pretext in order to en-
sure success. If employees decide not to sue because of this onerous
burden of proof they would face under the majority's scheme, the
Congressional purpose of eliminating discrimination would be frustrated
because victims would remain silent and endure the discrimination. 89
If employees decide to press ahead nonetheless, "the result will likely
be wasted time, effort, and money for all concerned.
' 19°
Moreover, the Court did not say that the trial court may limit the
introduction of evidence at trial. On the contrary, the scope of admissi-
ble evidence at trial is not at all limited by the employer's stated
reasons. However, even if the trial court may limit the introduction of
evidence to the employer's "vaguely" articulated reason, the careful
plaintiff will be forced to anticipate all possible reasons that may justi-
fy the defendant's adverse employment decision.' 9' Because the fact
finder may rely on any vaguely articulated reason to find for the de-
186. Id. at 2752.
187. Id. at 2754.
188. Id. at 2762 (Souter, J. dissenting).
189. Id. at 2763.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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fendant, the plaintiff must rebut all reasons that may "lurk in the re-
cord." 19
2
Another problem is that pre-trial discovery must now be expanded
because a much wider range of facts could prove relevant and impor-
tant at trial. Thus, the dissent argued that the Court's scheme will
promote both longer trials and more extensive pre-trial discovery.
93
This threatens an increased expense for both plaintiffs and defendants
in Title VII litigation.
194
Finally, the "perverse result[s]" of the majority opinion will bene-
fit employers who are unable to discover the true reasons for its em-
ployment decision and then lie about it in court.9" The majority,
however, stated that it is absurd to say that an individual is lying
when a fact finder disbelieves his testimony. 196 The dissent, on the
other hand, finds nothing unfair in labelling testimony which is disbe-
lieved by the fact finder as a lie.197 Thus, the dissent finds no justifi-
cation for favoring employers who present false evidence in court.' 9
Instead, employers should be bound by the reasons they put forth
rather than being exempted from responsibility for lying.' 9
Even more startling, employers who do not know the reason for
their employment decisions will be encouraged or even forced to lie in
order to defend successfully a Title VII action.' One is pressed to
think of another scheme that requires a party to lie in order to pre-
vail. 201
192. Id. at 2762-63.
193. Id. at 2763.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2764.
196. Id. at 2754.
197. Id. at 2763 n.11 (Souter, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 2763.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2764.
201. Id. at 2764; see also infra part V.C.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. The Plaintiff's Burden of Persuasion is Fulfilled by Dis-
crediting the Defendant's Reasons
It is undisputed that only the burden of production shifts to the
defendant after the plaintiff proves a prima facie case. The burden of
persuasion rests always with the plaintiff.20 2 That is, the plaintiff
continues to bear the "risk of non-persuasion.,2 0 3 The defendant need
only articulate a reason for the employment action. 204 This reason, if
presumed true, should be sufficient to justify judgment for the defen-
dant.2 5 The defendant is not obliged to offer proof of credibility
about its articulated reason. It is the plaintiff who must disprove the
defendant's reason.0 6 If the plaintiff cannot disprove the defendant's
reason, the plaintiff loses. 207 In this way, the plaintiff bears the risk
of being unable to convince the fact-finder on the issue of pretext.
Thus, Federal Rule of Evidence 301 is not violated because the defen-
dant is not required to prove that the proffered reason for the employ-
ment action is the true reason. On the contrary, the explanation is
presumed true and the plaintiff must disprove the reason. Otherwise,
the plaintiff loses.
Therefore, the question is not whether the plaintiff must prove
intentional discrimination, because this much is undisputed.0 8 In-
stead, the question is about how the plaintiff can prove intentional
discrimination. 20 9 The majority's scheme increases the plaintiffs bur-
den. Now, the plaintiff must do something more than merely discredit
the defendant's proffered reasons for the employment action. This is
clearly contrary to the language in McDonnell Douglas,
210
202. Id. at 2759.
203. FED. R. EVID. 301.
204. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 256.
207. See idt
208. Brief for E.E.O.C. as Amici Curiae, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct.
2742 (1993) (No. 92-602).
209. Id.
210. 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) (explaining that a plaintiff "must be afforded a fair
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Burdine,211 and Aikens. 212 These cases stated that the plaintiff could
meet the burden of proof indirectly by discrediting the defendant's
reasons. In other words, by proving that the defendant's reasons were
untrue, the plaintiff indirectly proves discrimination by a preponderance
of the evidence. This indirect approach is accomplished by showing
that the defendant who lies is, more likely than not, trying to cover up
the discrimination alleged by the plaintiff.2 3 This is consistent with
the teachings of McDonnell Douglas and the cases that followed.
These cases taught that the entire evidentiary framework was devel-
oped for the purpose of dealing with the problem of indirect or cir-
cumstantial evidence. 214 However, the effect of the Court's holding is
that even persuasive indirect evidence may no longer be enough to
sustain a finding of discrimination.
Under the majority's analysis, the plaintiff who lacks direct
proof2 ' will now suffer the onerous burden of disproving all possi-
ble nondiscriminatory reasons that the trier of fact might discover in
the record.216 This increased burden is made clear by the majority's
suggestion that proving discrimination is equivalent to "disprov[ing] all
other reasons suggested, no matter how vaguely, in the record.
' 217
Furthermore, plaintiffs burden is increased because the plaintiff no
longer gets the benefit of focusing solely on disproving the defendant's
articulated reasons.
opportunity to demonstrate that [a defendant's] assigned reason[s] for refusing to re-employ
was a pretext or discriminatory in its application.") (emphasis added).
211. 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (explaining that plaintiffs may meet their burden of
persuasion "either directly . . . or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered expla-
nation is unworthy of credence.") (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05).
212. 460 U.S. at 716 (quoting language from Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)).
213. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2763 (1993) (Souter, J. dissent-
ing).
214. Id. at 2757.
215. Ironically, most plaintiffs who are in court are there precisely because they lack
direct proof. If a plaintiff has the "smoking gun" showing that the defendant intentionally
violated Title VII, such a case would likely settle out of court.
216. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2763 (Souter, J. dissenting).
217. Id. at 2755-56.
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B. Narrowing the Factual Inquiry
The dissent highlighted the true purpose of placing the burden of
production on the defendant after the plaintiff proves a prima facie
case.2 8 As indicated in Burdine, once the defendant meets this bur-
den of production, the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of spec-
ificity.219 The majority's explanation of this new level of specificity
is that the focus is narrowed to the question of discriminatory motiva-
tion.220 It requires little effort to see the majority's error in this re-
gard. The focus is on discriminatory motivation throughout the trial.
Therefore, focusing on the question of discriminatory motivation in no
way narrows the factual inquiry. Rather, under the majority's analysis,
the inquiry remains unchanged.
In addition, placing the burden of production on the defendant
serves two important purposes, the second of which is neglected by
the majority. 221 First, the burden of production forces the defendant
to meet the plaintiff's prima facie case by offering a legitimate reason
for the employment decision.222 Second, the remaining factual issue
is framed with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a fair
opportunity to show pretext.223 These purposes are consistent with
the plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuasion because, if the plaintiff
proves pretext, it is more likely than not that the defendant was driven
by discriminatory motivation.
In Burdine, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to actual-
ly shift the burden of persuasion onto the defendant because it feared
that the employer could compose fictitious reasons for his actions.224
The Supreme Court rejected this holding.225 In response to the Fifth
218. Id. at 2759 (Souter J., dissenting).
219. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
220. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
221. Id. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting).
222. Burdine, 4.50 U.S. at 255.
223. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2759 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56).
224. Burdine, 4-50 U.S. at 257-58 (quoting Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc. 555 F.2d
1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977)).
225. Id. at 258 (1981).
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Circuit's concerns that the defendant could get away with lying, the
Court found that limiting the defendant's burden to one of production
will not unduly hinder the plaintiff because the defendant's explanation
is required to be "clear and reasonably specific".226 Thus, the plain-
tiff gets a fair opportunity to respond.227
But Hicks undercuts Burdine's requirement that the defendant's
reasons be "clear and reasonably specific" in order to narrow the fac-
tual inquiry to allow the plaintiff a fair opportunity to respond.228 In
fact, there is no longer a requirement that the defendant produce "clear
and reasonably specific" reasons because the defendant can now escape
liability based on wholly unarticulated reasons. Thus, Burdine cannot
survive the holding in Hicks that requires the plaintiff to "disprove all
other reasons suggested, no matter how vaguely, in the record." 229
C. The Majority's Hypothetical
The majority's hypothetical, previously set forth, misplaced the
concern underlying Title VII litigation. The hypothetical is concerned
with protecting those employers who do not have direct evidence of a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.230 The concern should be in
dealing with the plaintiff's problem of indirect proof. The Court used
the hypothetical to say that, in some cases, the employer with strong
circumstantial evidence of non-discrimination could lose to a plaintiff
with a weak prima facie case, even though the plaintiff would not
appear to have enough evidence to sustain the burden of persua-
sion.23' This hypothetical, however, is misleading. First, the hypothet-
ical is not analogous to Hicks. In the hypothetical, the employer pre-
sumably cannot identify its reasons. In Hicks, however, the employer
did come forward with a reason but the fact finder found the reason to
be discredited.232 This hypothetical, therefore, presents a different
226. Id. at 258.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 255-56, 258; see also Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2759.
229. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2755-56.
230. Id. at 2750-51.
231. Id. at 2751.
232. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1251 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
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problem than one of an untruthful defendant. It' presents the problem
of an employer who simply doesn't know the reason for the employ-
ment action. Such a defendant is not affected by the Hicks decision
unless that defendant decides to fabricate a reason.
Under the Court's own analysis of how McDonnell Douglas oper-
ates, honest defendants will lose if they do not know the reason for
the employment action. If the employers do not have an explanation,
all the honest employers could do is remain silent and lose because
they could not rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case.233 Under Hicks,
the honest defendant would still lose. It is only by lying that a de-
fendant who does not know the reason for the employment decision
could possibly prevail. In this way, the majority's analysis encourages
employers to fabricate a reason when they cannot determine exactly
why the plaintiff was not hired.
Furthermore, contrary to what the Court stated, it is a rare case in
which the employer cannot identify a reason for its action, even if it
means reasoning inferentially from the facts. 2 4 Take the Court's hy-
pothetical, for example: the plaintiff's prima facie is weak, the appli-
cant is minimally qualified, and the employer has a high percentage of
minorities in its workforce. The honest employer would admit a lack
of personal knowledge but would also offer evidence to explain why
the reason could not have been discriminatory. The employer could
show the relative qualifications of those hired and the lack of
plaintiff's qualification to set him apart from the general applicant
pool. The employer would win.
In short, the Court's reliance on this hypothetical is misplaced. For
the reasons set forth above, this hypothetical falls short in the Court's
attempt to justify its holding. Instead, the majority's analysis encourag-
es defendants to be untruthful and then protects them if they need to
lie to defend themselves.
233. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
234. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2764 n.12 (Souter, J. dissenting).
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D. The Proper Interpretation of the Majority's Holding
The dissent argued that the majority's holding is susceptible to
two interpretations.2 35 However, the most accurate interpretation of
the Court's opinion indicates that discrediting the defendant's reasons
is sufficient at law to find for the plaintiff provided that the fact finder
concludes that such proof answers the ultimate question of intentiornal
discrimination. 236 The Court stated that the trier of fact would be
permitted to infer discrimination from the plaintiff's proof of pre-
text.237 Although a prediction of how the lower courts will interpret
Hicks would be premature, a few lower courts have adopted this inter-
pretation.238
Assuming that this interpretation is correct, the 1991 Amendments
to the Civil Rights Act providing for a jury trial will lessen the nega-
tive impact on Title VII plaintiffs.239 Juries are considered more
sympathetic to employees, while members of the federal judiciary are
viewed as employer oriented.' Thus, juries are more likely than
judges to conclude that the plaintiff who proves pretext has proven
discrimination under Title VII. One author describes "the game" now
as one of just getting to the jury.24' Indeed, the Court's holding per-
mits juries to come to the common sense conclusion that the lying
235. See supra part IV.B.3.
236. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 n.4.
237. Id. at 2749.
238. See, e.g., Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 65 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993) (quot-
ing with approval Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1991));
DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166, 170 (2nd Cir. 1993); Malone v. Signal
Processing Technologies, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 370 (D.Colo. 1993).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. III 1991) (providing the right to a jury trial in some
Title VII actions).
240. DOUGLAS B. HURON, 'HICKS' RULING: PLAINTIFFS' GOAL REMAINS GETTING TO
THE JURY, 1 EMPLOYMENT LAw STRATEGIST, (No. 4, August, 1993) (Leader Publications, a
division of New York Law Publishing, New York, N.Y.).
241. Id. The California Court of Appeals has concluded that Hicks will make it nearly
impossible for employers to succeed on summary judgment motions. Quite simply, even if
the plaintiff lacks specific evidence to show that the employer's reasons were pretextual, the
case still goes to the jury to decide the ultimate question of discrimination. Moisi v. Col-
lege of the Sequoias Community College Dist., 62 U.S.L.W. 2237 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1993)
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
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defendant is more likely than not covering up the illegal discrimination
alleged by the plaintiff.'2 If the defendant lies, juries will likely ad-
minister the "common sense" response, namely judgment for the plain-
tiff.
E. A Proposal for West Virginia
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has adopted the
McDonnell Dougla framework for West Virginia Human Rights Act
litigation.243 However, the purpose of the Human Rights Act now
mandates a deviation from the federal precedent. The purpose of the
West Virginia Human Rights Act states with force that employment
discrimination "is contrary to the principles of freedom and equality of
opportunity and is destructive to a free and democratic society." 2"
Furthermore, the Legislature mandated that the Act "be liberally con-
strued to accomplish its objectives and purposes." 245 It is a reason-
able inference that the legislature desired, that the courts not impose
heavy burdens and unreasonable limitations on plaintiffs. Such a heavy
burden would frustrate the purpose of the Act.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has not
placed an oppressive burden on plaintiffs under the Human Rights Act.
In fact, reassurance is found in Fourco Glass Co. v. West Virginia
Human Rights Commission that the West Virginia court agrees with
the dissent's interpretation.246 The court states, unequivocally, that for
plaintiffs to prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence,
they "must demonstrate that the reason proffered by the employer is
untrue or not the true motivation for the discharge. ' 247 ' Also, the
242. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
243. Shepherdstown V.F.D. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 309 S.E.2d 342, 352-53
(W. Va. 1983).
244. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-2 (1990). The West Virginia Supreme Court compares un-
lawful discrimination to treason because both "undermin[e] the very foundations of our
democracy." Allen v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 324 S.E.2d 99, 108 (w. Va.
1984).
245. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-15 (1990).
246. 367 S.E.2d 760, 763 (W. Va. 1988).
247. Id.
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West Virginia court has quoted with approval the phrase from Burdine
which allows plaintiffs to succeed in meeting their burden of proof ei-
ther directly or indirectly by discrediting the defendant's proffered
reasons for the employment decision.24", Again, even the majority
agreed that this language in Burdine bears no other meaning but that a
lie by the defendant is alone enough to compel judgment for the plain-
tiff.
249
Therefore, West Virginia should not be swayed by the majority's
ultimate holding in Hicks. Instead, the court should remember the
strong public policy of eliminating discrimination. This public policy
of the West Virginia Human Rights Act is best served by the dissent's
interpretation of this issue.250 Moreover, language from West Virginia
Supreme Court precedent indicates that proof of pretext satisfies the
plaintiff's burden of proof.25'
VI. CONCLUSION
Initially, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks seems relatively innoc-
uous. After all, it merely held that the fact finder's rejection of the
defendant's asserted reasons is sufficient to sustain a judgment for the
plaintiff, but such a judgment is not compelled. The reasoning behind
this decision is that the plaintiff always bears the burden of persuasion
on the issue of discriminatory motive. 2  This reasoning is not dis-
puted.
What is disputed is the Court's interpretation of precedent. Hicks
is a deviation from the relevant precedent and this deviation will serve
to undermine the entire McDonnell Douglas framework. The presump-
248. State ex rel. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n v. Logan-Mingo Area Mental
Health Agency, Inc., 329 S.E.2d 77, 87 (W. Va. 1985). It is interesting to note that the
Court, when referring to this statement from Burdine, cites with approval Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion in United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
717 (1983). As previously indicated, Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence solely
to point out that the Court was holding what the dissent now asserts in Hicks.
249. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
250. See W. VA. CODE § 5-11-2 (1990) (setting forth the Declaration of Policy).
251. Fourco Glass Co., 367 S.E.2d 763.
252. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
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tion arising from the plaintiff's proof of a prima facie case has little
or no meaning, as the defendant can rebut this presumption with a lie.
Even further, the defendant can vaguely articulate many reasons, true
or false, to try to persuade the fact finder to adopt any one of them.
Placing the burden of production on the defendant, therefore, is a
"useless ritual" because it no longer serves the goal of narrowing the
factual inquiryY 3 Thus, the Court has reiterated that the plaintiff has
the "ultimate burden of persuasion" in convincing the fact finder of
discrimination. However, with the McDonnell Douglas analysis so
substantially altered, the plaintiffs are left with little guidance as to
how the burden of proof can be met with the indirect proof that typi-
cally characterizes Title VII litigation.
Likewise, Hicks is not even consistent with the purpose of Title
VII. On the contrary, the Title VII interpretation in Hicks is driven by
concern for employers who lie in court. In fact, under the majority's
analysis, the employer who does not know the reason for the adverse
employment action must lie or lose. 4 But that neglects the class of
people that Title VII was designed to protect, namely victims of em-
ployment discrimination.
Consequently, Congressional action is expected. In fact, it is re-
ported that legislation will be introduced to overturn this decision.256
While its clear that Congress has implicitly approved "a framework
carefully crafted in precedents as old as twenty years," 257 it is not so
obvious that Congress has adopted the interpretation of the Hicks ma-
jority. Like Hicks, another decision of the Court also "weakened the
scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections."5 8 Con-
253. Id. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 2755.
255. Id. at 2766 (Souter, J. dissenting). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988 & Supp. III
1991), as amended.
256. Senator Howard Metzenbaum, Chair of the Subcommittee on Labor of the Com-
mittee on Labor and Human Resources, plans to introduce legislation that will overturn St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). This information was obtained pursu-
ant to a telephone interview with Len Henzke, Staff Assistant to Senator Howard
Metzenbaum (September 8, 1993).
257. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2764.
258. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Supp. III 1991) (listing the purposes of the 1991 Amend-
ment, one of which was to overturn Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
248 [Vol. 96:217
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gress responded with the 1991 Amendment to the Civil Rights Act
1964.259 Thus, Title VII plaintiffs are once again forced to look
the legislative process for protection from harsh judicial doctrine.
Teresa Clark Postle*
(1989)).
259. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991), as amended.
* The author wishes to express gratitude to Professor Robert M. Bastress and Pro-
fessor Franklin D. Cleckley, both of West Virginia University. Their assistance is greatly
appreciated.
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